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Institutional Ownership and Private Equity Placements: 
Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of institutional ownership on the performance of 
private equity placements (PEPs) for listed firms in China. We find that the presence 
of institutional investors can alleviate the information asymmetries between listed 
firms and the market. The market reaction to PEP announcements is significantly 
smaller if there is a higher portion of institutional shareholdings. Long-term firm 
operational performance after PEPs is positively correlated with institutional 
shareholdings. Moreover, we find that the relationship between institutional 
shareholdings and PEP performance is mainly driven by non-listed corporate investors 
and mutual funds. Finally, the relationship between PEP performance and institutional 
shareholdings is stronger in smaller PEP issuers. 
 
Key words: Institutional ownership; Private equity placements (PEPs); Information 
asymmetry; Strategic investor; Liquidity investor 
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[Type text] 
 
1. Introduction 
Institutional shareholders are pivotal players in the capital market. According to 
Hanouna et al. (2015), the value of assets managed by U.S. mutual funds management 
companies increased from 4.4 to 12.7 trillion USD during 2000–2014. Institutional 
investors in emerging markets also expanded rapidly. During 2008–2012, the value of 
total assets under the management of private equity firms and hedge funds doubled, 
and that of mutual funds, insurance companies, pension funds and commercial banks 
increased by 50% in 25 emerging economies.2  
What is the role of institutional investors in the capital market? Do they simply 
exploit the information of their portfolio companies, or do they actively participate in 
external corporate governance? Existing literature has shown that institutional 
investors conduct progressively stronger external supervision as their shareholdings 
increase (Black and Coffee, 1994). Marciukaityte et al. (2005) show that an increase 
in institutional ownership helps alleviate the information asymmetries between 
corporate boards and outside investors. However, the role of institutional investors 
still remains unclear in emerging markets. As corporate ownership is highly 
concentrated in emerging economies, controlling shareholders may extract private 
benefits at the expense of minority shareholders (Allen et al., 2005; He et al., 2017). 
Institutional investors may collude with controlling shareholders to expropriate 
corporate resources (Pound, 1988), especially in emerging economies where financial 
and legal systems are still underdeveloped.  
In this paper, we provide new evidence on the role of institutional investors in 
China for private equity placements (PEPs). PEPs are a channel through which listed 
firms can raise external funds (Carey et al., 1993). Unlike public offerings, PEPs 
                                                        
2 These data are from the report “Development and Regulation of Institutional Investors in Emerging 
Markets” in June 2012, published by International Organization of Securities Commissions. 
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typically involve a small group of investors with a strong capital base. In this way, the 
cost of raising external capital may be reduced, e.g., a low communication cost 
between the firm and investors. In the meanwhile, issuing new equity to large 
shareholders may also help align the interests of corporate insiders with minority 
shareholders. Studying PEPs provides us a setting in which we can observe the market 
attitudes toward various institutional investors in China. PEPs have gradually become 
a dominant financing tool for listed firms since the issuance of “Measures for the 
Administration of the Issuance of Securities by Listed Companies” in May 2006 by 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). About 225 billion RMB was raised 
through PEPs in 2013, accounting for 80.16% of total funds raised in that year. This 
percentage was much higher than the fund raised through other external financing 
channels such as public offerings (e.g. seasoned equity offerings). Thus, an analysis of 
the participation of institutional investors in the PEPs will shed light on their roles in 
China’s capital markets.  
China’ unique setting is well-suited to examine the role of institutional investors. 
First, the number of institutional investors has grown rapidly in recent years in tandem 
with fast economic growth in the country. The number of mutual funds increased from 
50 in 2001 to 2,048 in September 2014, and the value of net assets under the 
management of mutual funds increased by nearly 30 times in the same period. Second, 
He and Rui (2016) find that the supervision over managers and largest shareholders 
has become more efficient in China recently. Investigating the role of institutional 
investors in China may help us understand the incentives of capital market 
participants in emerging countries. Finally, since the market-oriented reform in the 
financial sector in 1994,3 more and more private and foreign institutional investors 
                                                        
3 In March 2015, Xiaochuan Zhou, the Governor of the People’s Bank of China, stated that “The 
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have obtained licenses to undertake investments in the capital market. A large number 
of non-state-owned institutional investors has emerged and played an increasingly 
important role in China’s capital markets. The increasing heterogeneity of institutional 
investors provides us with a valuable setting to investigate how shareholder identities 
affect firm performance.  
Using the PEP data from Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges during 2005–
2013, we find that the market reacts positively to PEP announcements on average, but 
the reaction is smaller if there are higher institutional shareholdings ex ante the PEP 
announcements. Also, institutional shareholdings ex ante have predictive power over 
the issuing firm’s long-term operational performance ex post the PEPs. Thus, we 
argue that institutional shareholdings could alleviate the information asymmetries 
between listed firms and market investors so that the market would exhibit less 
over-optimism about PEP announcements. In other words, without the presence of 
institutional investors ex ante, the market reaction to PEP announcements would be 
higher. With increased participation of the original institutional investors in the PEP, 
the market reaction would increase significantly.  
We show that institutional ownership has an impact on the market return of PEP 
announcements through the signaling effect. Apart from the fact that institutional 
ownership has been widely used as a proxy for information asymmetry (O’Brien and 
Bhushan, 1990), further findings also support our argument that signaling effect leads 
to the positive market reaction. First, we classify institutional investors into strategic 
                                                                                                                                                               
continued expansion of Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs) is an important part of China’s 
current financial reform. China will expand investment quotas for the Qualified Domestic Institutional 
Investors (QDIIs) and QFIIs.” Relevant information can be found on the website of Xinhua News 
Agency, titled “China to expand quotas of QDII, QFII, Xiaochuan Zhou” posted on November 27, 2013 
(http://en.xinhua08.com/a/20131127/1278431.shtml). 
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and liquidity investors following Noe (2002) and Ferreira and Matos (2008). We find 
that the impact of the participation of original institutional investors on the market 
reactions is greater for liquidity investors than that for strategic investors. Unlike 
strategic investors, liquidity investors are normally outside parties who do not share 
potential business ties with the issuer. Thus, liquidity investors are less likely to 
collude with the firm and more likely to reveal the true type of the firm. As a result, 
the signaling effect of liquidity investors is expected to be stronger than that of 
strategic investors. Second, when the largest shareholder participates in the PEP, 
higher institutional ownership ex ante would be associated with a deeper PEP discount, 
and such impact is mainly driven by liquidity investors. According to Benveniste and 
Spindt (1989), in order to induce informed investors to reveal their information about 
the quality of the IPO, the issuer would lower the offer price (i.e., a deeper discount). 
Similarly, in order to induce institutional investors to participate in the private 
placement, the issuer would also offer the shares at a greater discount. Thus, we 
conjecture that the discount rate is the mechanism through which institutional 
investors alleviate the information asymmetry. Third, we find that the impact of 
institutional shareholdings on PEP market reactions is more pronounced in smaller 
firms. Compared with larger firms, smaller firms have severer information asymmetry 
due to less analyst coverage and limited market attention, and thus the market is more 
uncertain about the quality of a PEP issued by them. As a result, the signaling effect of 
institutional ownership on market reaction is stronger in smaller firms. We also find 
that market reaction is stronger in SOEs than in private firms (although not 
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statistically significant). As Chinese SOEs are often quite opaque, the signaling effect 
is expected to be stronger with higher institutional holdings in SOEs than in private 
firms. 
One may suspect that there is endogeneity in our empirical results. It should be 
noted that we use the level of institutional ownership in the quarter before the 
announcement quarter. Thus, it is unlikely that the institutional investors anticipate a 
lower market reaction and choose to increase their shareholdings. In addition, we 
control for the fixed effects on the industry, year and season to address the concern 
that some unobservable factors may concurrently affect market reaction and 
institutional ownership. As a robustness test, we employ the firm’s weighting in the 
CSI 300 Index as the instrumental variable for institutional ownership. We expect that 
institutional holdings are positively correlated with a firm’s weighting in the CSI 300 
Index, while a firm’s weighting in the CSI 300 Index is exogenous to the market 
reaction to a PEP announcement. The results are qualitatively similar when the 
institutional ownership is instrumented with firms’ weightings in the CSI 300 Index. 
To address the possible selection bias, we also use propensity score matching to 
identify the control group (PEP firms with institutional ownership less than 5%) and 
compare the market reaction with the treatment group (PEP firms with institutional 
ownership no less than 5%). Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that higher 
institutional holdings ex ante lead to smaller market reactions. 
Our study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, using the data on PEPs 
in China, our study provides a comprehensive investigation into the role of different 
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types of institutional investors in the largest emerging market in the world. Despite 
growing attention on institutional investors in emerging markets, little research has 
examined their impact on firm performance. Our results suggest that institutional 
investors can reduce information asymmetry and affect firm performance in China. 
Second, our research provides new insights into the long-term performance of PEPs. 
The existing literature documents a poor long-term performance of PEPs (Loughran 
and Ritter, 1995; Kang et al., 1999; Jeanneret, 2005). We contribute to this strand of 
literature by showing that institutional investors have predictive power over the 
long-term performance ex post the PEPs. Furthermore, we investigate the 
heterogeneity of institutional investors and show how it is associated with the reform 
of Chinese capital market. Despite the introduction of private equity and foreign 
investors, we do not find any significant enhancing effect on firms’ corporate 
governance and performance. Therefore, in order to enhance market transparency, it is 
essential to further reform the capital market in China and enhance the diversity of 
institutional investors. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
institutional background in China and develops hypotheses. Section 3 presents the 
data and empirical methodology. Section 4 reports estimation results. Section 5 
provides a robustness check. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Institutional background and hypothesis development 
2.1 Institutional background 
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Institutional investors are financial institutions that have a strong capital base, with a 
stated purpose of creating capital gains through investment activities. The number of 
institutional investors in China has grown immensely during the past decade. In 
particular, mutual funds have quickly recovered from the shocks of the global 
financial crisis.4 Figure 1 shows that the number of mutual funds increased more than 
22 times from 2004 to September 2014, and a similar upward trend for the total assets 
under the management of mutual funds is evident. Despite a setback during the global 
financial crisis, the total assets of mutual funds remained at about 1 trillion RMB, 
which continued to grow after the crisis. Furthermore, China has allowed qualified 
foreign institutional investors (QFIIs) to engage in investment activities in the 
domestic stock market since 2003. The Chinese financial authorities issued the 
“Guidance for QFIIs Securities Investment” in 2003, which allowed QFIIs to invest in 
certain stocks and bonds listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. There 
are 13 types of institutional investors in the Chinese capital market: QFIIs, private 
equity, mutual funds, social security funds, brokerage firms, commercial banks, 
insurance companies, trust funds, pension funds, listed corporate investors, non-listed 
corporate investors, financial affiliations and specialized financial products. 
The PEP market has expanded rapidly in China. The “Measures for the 
Administration of the Issuance of Securities by Listed Companies” released by the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) shows that profitability is not a 
requirement for PEP issuers. In addition, listed firms are free to raise funds from their 
controlling shareholders and institutional investors. PEPs could be a suitable channel 
                                                        
4 According to survey data by the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) in 
2012, the compounded annual growth rate of the total assets under management reached 25.4% during 
2008–2010, with 16,633 mutual fund products in total. The quick recovery coincided with a rapid 
economic recovery in the capital market. It indicates that a high inflow of mutual funds boosted 
investor confidence and probably contributed to the economic growth. 
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to raise funds in order to enhance the asset quality and market prospects of a firm. In 
addition, a more lenient disclosure requirement for PEPs facilitates the flow of funds 
between investors and fund-raisers. Consequently, PEPs have become a dominant 
channel for listed firms to raise capital in China. As of November 22 2014, there were 
1,546 cases of successful PEPs in China, with the issuance of capital reaching 2,688 
billion RMB.  
There has been a significant increase of institutional ownership in PEPs. Figure 2 
shows that institutional ownership increased from 4.8% in 2005 to 38% in 2013. This 
increase was accompanied by a rising number of PEPs in the wake of the global 
financial crisis. Listed firms demanded substantial funds in order to recover from the 
global financial crisis in China, and the participation of institutional investors in PEPs 
helped raise sufficient external finance. 
(Insert Figures 1 and 2 Here) 
 
2.2 Hypothesis development 
First, we examine the effect of institutional ownership on the announcement returns of 
PEPs. An extensive strand of literature has documented a positive market reaction to 
the announcement of PEPs, e.g., Wruck (1989) reports a 4.4% average abnormal 
return when PEPs are announced in the US. Chemmanur and Jiao (2011) find that 
higher pre-offer net buying by institutional investors is associated with lower discount 
rates in seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) as institutional investors facilitate the 
circulation of insider information.  
Institutional investors and controlling shareholders are major participants in 
PEPs. When institutional investors subscribe to substantially large shareholdings (or 
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all) of new issues, they are informed as much as controlling shareholders on the firm 
operation, performance and profitability. Furthermore, the information advantage by 
institutional investors manifests itself not only during the PEP announcement period 
but also in the pre-offer period when certain insider information may be disseminated 
to these institutional investors. If institutional investors subscribe over 5% of the 
issued shares—without going through PEPs—they have to disclose these transactions 
in accordance with the relevant regulations.5 Institutional investors may reveal their 
proprietary information to uninformed investors on the value of PEPs. As a result, the 
conduct of institutional investors ex ante PEPs can alleviate the information 
asymmetries between the firm and uninformed investors, which may undermine the 
signaling effect of PEPs. Thus, we propose our first hypothesis:  
H1: The announcement return is negatively related to institutional ownership. 
Existing studies show that PEPs do not produce significant excess returns in the 
long-term ex post performance. However, Chemmanur et al. (2009) find that 
institutional investors could distinguish seasoned equity offerings with better long-run 
stock returns, and SEOs with greater pre-offer net buying by institutional investors 
have a smaller discount. Hence, institutional investors are more likely to select PEPs 
with attractive investment returns and achieve a better long-term performance. 
Furthermore, the superior knowledge of institutional investors on stock-picking can 
help choose PEPs with better investment returns. Thus, we propose our second 
hypothesis as follows:  
H2: The long-term performance of firms increases with institutional ownership. 
                                                        
5 See Articles 13, 14 and 16 in the “Decision on Amending Article 63 of the ‘Administration Measures 
on Takeover of Listed Companies’” (CSRC Decree No. 56). When the equities of an investor and its 
concerted parties reach 5% of a listed firms’ total issued shares, they are required to file a report with 
the CSRC and make an announcement about their further transactions. The requirements vary across 
different types of transactions. 
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In terms of the heterogeneity among institutional investors, Noe (2002) divides 
institutional investors into strategic investors and liquidity investors according to their 
monitoring incentives even if they are not largest shareholders. Bushee (1998) 
analyzes the behaviors of institutional investors and classifies them into three 
categories: transient institutional investors, grey institutional investors and dedicated 
institutional investors. Ferreira and Matos (2008) classify institutional investors into 
grey institutional investors and independent investors by the business ties between 
institutional investors and firms. Chen et al. (2007) argue that only dedicated 
independent institutions have strong incentives to monitor firms, and grey institutional 
investors may reduce their holdings in underperforming firms. In this paper, we 
classify institutional investors into strategic and liquidity investors in order to 
disentangle the channel through which institutional investors can affect firm 
performance. We look at independent and grey institutional investors according to the 
potential business ties with PEP issuers. As liquidity investors only passively gather 
information and form investment portfolios with the highest return ex ante, they are 
not actively monitoring the firms. We propose our third hypothesis as follows: 
H3: The presence of independent liquidity investors is associated with a better 
performance of the listed firms that they invest in.  
Due to an absence of supervision by private shareholders, state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) is beset by managers’ private benefits (Wang, 2010), and the 
improvement in corporate governance fostered by privatization is well documented in 
the existing literature. For example, Qian (1996) shows that SOEs are exposed to 
substantial policy burdens and high agency costs, and Qiang (2003) shows that a 
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higher proportion of SOE shares is associated with a lower performance in China.6 In 
contrast, institutional investors may help alleviate information asymmetries and 
expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders in private firms. 
Schmidt and Fahlenbrach (2017) show that firms with a higher level of passive 
institutional ownership are associated with poor corporate governance and high 
agency costs. We rule out the monitoring role of institutional investors and assume 
they only alleviate information asymmetry. We categorize them into strategic and 
liquidity investors, and also check their impact on corporate investment behavior. As 
information asymmetry is more pronounced for small and poorly performing firms 
(Hong et al., 2000), we propose our fourth hypothesis as follows: 
H4: The effect of institutional ownership is more pronounced in private, small 
and poorly performing firms. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
Our sample covers all listed firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges 
that have raised capital through PEPs from 2005 to 2013. Firms in financial and utility 
industries are excluded due to their high sensitivity to government regulations. We 
drop the firm-year observations if a stock is subject to the special treatment status 
(known as “ST stock”).7 We finally obtain 972 sample firms that have conducted 
                                                        
6 In August 2013, a listed SOE, the BOE Technology Group (000725.SZ), issued the largest PEP at the 
time in the A-share market, raising 46 billion RMB. This was BOE’s fourth round of PEPs since 2006. 
However, the company’s stock returns were quite poor, with an annual return of less than 10%. 
7 In the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, stock identified with an “ST” or “*ST” label means 
that a firm has suffered losses for at least two consecutive years or has commenced delisting 
procedures. 
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PEPs during 2005–2013.8 Data on PEPs and institutional shareholdings are retrieved 
from WIND, a leading database on listed firms in China, and the firm characteristics 
are retrieved from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) 
database. We rely on the seasonal data of institutional shareholdings in order to 
capture the changes of institutional ownership.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
Using a balanced panel data, we estimate an OLS model of firm performance 
following Chemmanur et al. (2009). We examine the role of institutional investors in 
two ways: original institutional ownership before PEP announcements (Institutional 
holding) and participation by institutional investors in the PEPs following 
announcements (Participation). We also include an interaction term of Institutional 
holding and Participation to examine the incremental impact of original institutional 
investors choosing to participate in the PEPs. 
ܨ݅ݎ݉	ܲ݁ݎ݂݋ݎ݉ܽ݊ܿ݁
ൌ ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ	݄݋݈݀݅݊ ௜݃,௧ ൅ ܲܽݎݐ݅ܿ݅݌ܽݐ݅݋݊௜,௧
൅ ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ	݄݋݈݀݅݊ ௜݃,௧	x	ܲܽݎݐ݅ܿ݅݌ܽݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൅ ܴܱܣ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௧ିଵ
൅ ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ܥ݋݈݈݁ܿݐ௜,௧ ൅ ܲݎ݅݋r_90ܣܴ௜,௧ ൅ ܦ݅ݏܿ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜,௧ ൅ ܲݎ݅݋ݎ_90ܴ݅ݏ݇
൅ ܱܵܧ ൅ ܮܽݎ݃݁ݏݐ ൅ ܤ݋ܽݎ݀ ൅ ܫ݊݀݁݌݁݊݀݁݊ܿ݁ ൅ ܦݑ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ 
Firm Performance is measured as the short-term stock return, long-term stock 
return and long-term operational performance. The short-term stock return is 
measured by the cumulative abnormal return over an event window of [-3, +3] around 
                                                        
8 We cross-check the confounding events such as SEOs and institutional ownership change (by at least 
5%) due to secondary market transactions, debt conversion and M&A (Butler and Wan, 2010; Pontiff 
and Woodgate, 2008; Affleck-Graves and Miller, 2003; Ikenberry et al., 1995). We find qualitatively 
similar results, and the results are omitted for brevity.  
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the announcement date, i.e., CAR [-3, +3].9 The long-term stock return is measured 
as the cumulative abnormal return starting from the PEP announcement date till 365 
trading days afterwards. In the robustness check, we also measure such returns using 
alternative asset pricing models, and the results are qualitatively similar. The 
long-term operational performance is measured by one-year and three-year average 
ROA following the PEPs. Also, we include the change of capital expenditure, CAPEX 
[0, 1], which is the ratio of net cash flow spent on investment to total asset in the year 
after the PEPs. Definitions of key variables are listed in the Appendix, and all 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
ROA, Size and Leverage are included to control for the characteristics of listed 
firms. Collect is the logarithm of the capital raised by PEPs. Discount is the discount 
rate that the offer taker accepts for the PEPs. We include the average abnormal return 
(using a market model) for the 90 days before the event window to control for the 
stock anomalies that are independent of the PEPs and its standard deviation during the 
same period to control for the volatility. We also control for a set of corporate 
governance variables: state ownership of the firm (SOE), ownership of the largest 
shareholder (Largest), the log of the number of board members (Board), the portion of 
independent directors (Independence) and whether the CEO is also the chairman of 
the board (Duality).  
 
3.3 Summary statistics 
Table 1 summarizes the frequency of PEPs in China from 2005 to 2013. Since the 
                                                        
9 The results are qualitatively similar if we use CAR [-1, +1]. 
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implementation of the “Guidance for Share Issuance” in 2006,10 PEPs have become a 
dominant fund-raising tool for Chinese listed firms. The average institutional 
ownership of such PEPs rose from 4.8% in 2005 to 38.0% in 2013.11 
(Insert Tables 1 Here) 
To cross-check the consistency with the existing literature, we firstly replicate 
the market reactions to the announcements of PEPs. We calculate the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) in the period surrounding the announcements of PEPs and 
examine whether the CARs are significantly different from zero. Table 2 shows that 
the average of CAR[-3, +3] is 17.1%, while the median is 4.6%, which are 
statistically significant at the 1% level and consistent with the existing literature 
(Wruck, 1989; Lu et al., 2011; Fonseka et al., 2014).12  
The market reaction to PEP announcements differ significantly from that of 
public equity offering. There have been different studies on China’s public equity 
offerings. In contrast to our finding that the median CAR[-3, +3] for PEPs in China is 
4.6%, Shahid et al. (2010) argue that the SEO’s announcement effect has a CAR[-3, 
+3] of -1.44% in China, while this negative market reaction to the SEO 
announcements is consistent with other prior studies in China (Cheung et al., 2006; 
Fung et al., 2008).  
The negative market reaction to SEO announcements follows the overvaluation 
hypothesis developed by Myers and Majluf (1984). Specifically, when there is severe 
                                                        
10 Before May 2006, only two PEPs took place: Dazhong Transportation Group (600611.SH) and J.S. 
Corrugating Machinery (000821.SZ). 
11 Table 1 in the online appendix shows the industry distribution of PEPs, while the three industries with 
the highest frequencies of PEPs are manufacturing (584), sales (55) and energy (48). 
12 We use unadjusted stock price to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). In untabulated tests, we 
also use adjusted stock price to calculate CARs, and the results are qualitatively similar. 
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information asymmetry between the issuing firm and the market, a large mispricing 
would discourage good firms from issuing equity, and thus the market would treat 
public equity issuance as a bad signal of the firm’s quality. However, the story is quite 
different in private equity placements, in which only a small group of investors are 
approached by the issuing firm. Since PEP investors mostly consist of corporate 
insiders and sophisticated institutional investors, the information asymmetry is 
mitigated to a large extent. Using US data, Hertzel et al. (2002) find that public listed 
firms that place equity privately have positive announcement returns in the short run 
but a negative stock-price performance ex post in the long run, which is due to 
investors’ over-optimism about the firms’ prospects. 
In addition, Table 2 also shows summary statistics for other key variables in the 
model. On the one hand, the short-term stock return to the PEPs is more pronounced 
than the long-term stock returns. On the other hand, institutional investors account for 
21.7% of the shareholdings, which substantiates their essential role in China. In 
addition, there are wide variations of PEPs characteristics such as the purchase 
discount and the funds collected (shown as the proportion of total assets). Participants 
of PEPs can have a 21.5% discount rate based on the market closing price, which 
induces investors to participate in the PEPs despite a poor performance in the long run 
(Wruck, 1989).  
(Insert Table 2 Here) 
 
3.4 Graphic comparison 
To illustrate the impact of the presence of institutional investors in the PEPs, we 
create a graphic comparison of market reactions to PEP announcements. We define a 
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firm as with the presence of institutional shareholdings if no less than 5% of its total 
investors are institutional investors (Group 1); otherwise, the firm is defined as 
without the presence of institutional shareholdings (Group 0). Figure 3 illustrates the 
CARs in 60 trading days around PEP announcements, and Figure 4 illustrates the 
relative trading volume for 120 trading days around PEP announcements. The 
abnormal return is computed from a market model, and the relative trading volume is 
calculated using the trading volume scaled by the average trading volume during the 
360 trading days before the PEP announcements. Both figures show that the market 
reaction is smoother with the presence of institutional investors. In particular, Figure 3 
shows that the average market reaction to the PEP announcement is positive, 
regardless of institutional investors’ presence ex ante. However, with the presence of 
institutional investors, the market reacts less aggressively, and the stock movement 
exhibits less volatility. This implies that institutional investors play a role of stabilizer 
for the stock price of the holding company. The presence of institutional investors ex 
ante helps reveal the true quality of the issuing firm. The signaling effect alleviates 
the information asymmetry between the PEP issuer and the market, so that the market 
could perceive the firm’s prospects more rationally, which leads to a smaller market 
reaction. Furthermore, if the original institutional investors participate in the PEP 
project, it conveys a positive signal to the market on the quality of the PEP project and 
a better prospect of the PEP issuer. 
(Insert Figures 3 and 4 Here) 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1  The impact of institutional ownership on stock returns 
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Regarding the role of institutional investors in equity issuances, Chemmanur et al. 
(2009) investigate US public equity offerings and argue that institutional investors 
possess private information about SEOs and play a role of information production 
instead of manipulative trading. Consistently, we will show that the institutional 
investors’ role of alleviating information asymmetry between the issuing firm and the 
market is also significant in private equity placements. First of all, the online 
Appendix Table 2 shows the results of the univariate test on the relation between 
institutional ownership and firm performance. When the institutional ownership is 
sorted by CAR[-3, +3], the institutional ownership in the bottom half of the sample 
(32.4%) is higher than that in the top half (27.6%), and the difference is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. However, we do not find any significant difference in the 
institutional ownership between groups with high versus low levels of long-term stock 
returns.  
Model (1) of Table 3 shows that a higher institutional holding before the PEP 
announcements is associated with a lower short-term stock return, and the result is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, institutional investors ex ante may 
convey insider information to uninformed investors and thus lead to a lower 
short-term stock return. In addition, the participation of institutional investors in the 
PEPs also lowers the market reaction, which suggests that institutional investors’ 
involvement in the PEPs may alleviate the uncertainty of the issuer’s quality and thus 
smooth the market reaction. Interestingly, the coefficient of the interaction term 
between institutional holding and participation is positive and significant at the 5% 
level in Model (2) of Table 3, while the results are qualitatively similar in Models (3)–
(5) with a more comprehensive set of control variables. To put it differently, the 
participation of institutional investors in the PEPs given a high institutional 
[Type text] 
 
shareholdings ex ante will induce a higher market reaction on the contrary. We 
conjecture that such “double certification” by institutional investors conveys a good 
signal of the PEPs, which leads to a higher market reaction.  
(Insert Table 3 Here) 
 
4.2 The impact of institutional ownership on firm performance 
When examining the sensitivity between institutional ownership and long-run 
performance, we also add the market reactions, CAR[-3, +3], as one of the 
independent variables. In this way, we could identify more clearly whether the 
predictive power over firm performance comes from the information revealed by 
institutional investors or by the PEP announcement. Table 4 shows that the long-term 
firm profitability, i.e., 3-year average ROA, could jointly be predicted by the market 
reaction, the institutional holdings ex ante and the participation of institutional 
investors in Model (2), and the economic significance of the predictive power is much 
stronger with the presence of institutional investors compared with Model (1). This 
implies that institutional investors indeed have superior ability in identifying better 
performing PEP firms. Model (4) of Table 4 shows that the coefficient of CAR[-3, +3] 
is significantly negative at the 1% level, i.e., a higher market reaction leads to a lower 
capital expenditure in the year following the PEP announcement. However, the results 
suggest that institutional investors are unlikely to affect corporate investment 
decisions such as capital expenditures. Instead, institutional investors are capable of 
selecting stocks with better long-run performance. To some extent, it also implies that 
the information revealed by institutional investors is more about the overall quality of 
the issuing firm rather than merely the quality of the PEP itself.  
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(Insert Table 4 Here) 
We then conduct multiple cross-sectional tests by firm size, leverage, past 
performance and state ownership. Specifically, we split the sample by the median 
value of firm size, leverage, past performance and also by the state ownership. The 
results of the heterogeneity of market reactions by firm characteristics are reported in 
Table 5. We find that there is no systematically different performance by firm leverage, 
past performance and state ownership. However, with higher institutional holdings ex 
ante, the market reaction is significantly lower for small firms than for big firms. 
Compared with big firms, small firms draw little attention from the market and have 
less analyst coverage (Hong et al., 2000), and thus the market knows little about small 
firms. Therefore, the significantly smaller coefficient of institutional holdings in small 
firms indicates that the signaling effect of institutional ownership is more pronounced 
in small firms. Not surprisingly, this signaling effect does not exist for big firms as 
they face less information asymmetry and are more transparent. In contrast, in Table 3 
of the online Appendix, we show that there is no significant difference in the long-run 
performance (i.e., 3-year average ROA) following the PEP announcement across firm 
size, leverage, operating performance and state ownership. 
(Insert Table 5 Here) 
In addition, we also try various alternative asset pricing models to measure the 
abnormal stock returns, including the CAPM, Fama-French 3-factor and 5-factor 
models (Fama and French, 2015), and Hou et al. (2015) q-factor model. Our results 
[Type text] 
 
remain qualitatively similar using these alternative models.13 
 
4.3 Investor identity: strategic investors versus liquidity investors 
We will examine the heterogeneous monitoring incentives across different types of 
institutional investors and rule out the possibilities of a monitoring role of institutional 
investors. Brophy et al. (2004) show that post-issuance performance depends on the 
identity of the private placement buyer. We classify them into strategic investors 
versus liquidity investors (Noe, 2002). There are 13 types of institutional investors in 
the Chinese capital market. Strategic investors have proper monitoring incentives on 
firms, while liquidity investors do not. We classify listed and non-listed corporate 
investors, financial institutions (commercial banks, insurance and brokerage firms), 
state-owned funds (pension and social security funds) and private equity as strategic 
investors. We define corporate investors and financial institutions as grey institutions 
as they may have close business ties with PEP issuers, which may help acquire issuers’ 
proprietary information. State-owned funds have been on the rise in China recently. 
The central government has proper incentives to monitor the operation of PEP issuers 
for the sake of a stable and safe return, although pension funds may also have 
business ties with PEP issuers. However, pension funds account for less than 1% of 
institutional shareholdings, so categorizing pension funds as grey institutional 
investors does not change our results substantially. In contrast, we include mutual 
funds, QFIIs and asset managers (trust funds and specialized financial products) as 
liquidity investors as they mainly focus on selecting stocks and earning returns in the 
short term.  
                                                        
13  The results with alternative asset pricing models are available in online Appendix Table 4. 
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(Insert Table 6 Here) 
Table 6 shows that both strategic and liquidity institutional shareholdings ex ante 
can contribute to alleviating information asymmetries. The coefficients of both types 
of institutional shareholdings before PEP announcements are significantly negative. 
However, only liquidity investors’ shareholdings are associated with better operational 
performance in the long term (3-year ROA). Interestingly, institutional shareholdings 
ex ante by strategic investors are positively associated with long-term stock returns 
and are significant at the 5% level, which suggests that some insider information 
cannot be fully exploited by liquidity investors. The coefficient of the interaction term 
of institutional shareholdings and institutional participation is negative for strategic 
investors, which almost cancels out the positive effect of strategic investors on the 
long-term stock returns. We do not find such patterns for liquidity investors, however. 
The expropriation of private benefits by strategic investors prevails in emerging 
market countries, which is harmful to firm valuations. Therefore, despite a signaling 
role of strategic investors ex ante the PEPs, market investors do not welcome their 
participation in the PEPs. In sum, we find that the monitoring role of institutional 
investors cannot explain the market reactions or the long-term operational 
performance of PEP issuers, which further substantiates their role in alleviating 
information asymmetries.  
The online Appendix Table 5 shows the composition of strategic investors and 
liquidity investors. We find that the weight heavily tilts towards non-listed corporate 
investors in the strategic investor category and towards mutual funds in the liquidity 
investor category. Therefore, we conjecture that the results for strategic and liquidity 
investors are mainly driven by these two types of institutional investors.  
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Table 6 in online appendix shows that among strategic investors, the alleviation 
of information asymmetries between issuers and the market can be attributed to 
non-listed corporate investors. Compared with listed corporate investors, non-listed 
corporate investors may convey more insider information that is not publicly available. 
Therefore, the market can retrieve more valuable signals from non-listed corporate 
investors, and the marginal effect on the market reaction should be higher than listed 
corporate investors. Furthermore, shares held by financial institutions are positively 
associated with firms’ operational performance. Commercial banks, for example, have 
expertise in acquiring the proprietary information of their borrowers and thus can 
select firms with better prospects (He et al., 2016). Therefore, when commercial 
banks become strategic investors, the operational performance of PEP issuers should 
be higher in the long run. However, as commercial banks may have business ties with 
PEP issuers, they also have a chance to collude with the controlling shareholders. This 
may explain the negative coefficient of the interaction term between bank ownership 
and banks’ participation in the PEPs for the operational performance. Finally, there is 
no significant impact of private equity shareholdings on the operational performance 
in the long run, although private equity can typically improve corporate governance 
and operational performance in industrial countries.  
Online Appendix Table 7 shows that among liquidity investors, mutual funds not 
only reduce information asymmetries but also have superior knowledge about 
selecting better stocks in the long run. With the participation of new mutual funds, the 
announcement effect is higher by 8.3% and significant at the 10% level for the CAR 
[0, 365]. Also, despite a small weight in the composition of institutional investors, 
asset managers such as various financial products can also select stocks with better 
operational performance. Finally, foreign institutional investors have limited power in 
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explaining operational performance, which may be due to limited presence in China.  
 
5. Robustness tests 
5.1 Endogeneity 
We have employed the event study approach to examine the impact of institutional 
investors on firm performance, which mitigates the endogeneity concerns. We use 
private equity placement as the event in which we study the role of institutional 
investors. In order to further strengthen the robustness of our findings, we employ our 
sample firms’ weightings in the CSI 300 Index as the instrumental variable for 
institutional ownership. 14  Institutional investors tend to pay more attention to 
constituent stocks of market index and increase their shareholdings in constituent 
stocks with higher weightings (Boone and White, 2015; Crane et al., 2016). Therefore, 
we expect that institutional holdings are positively correlated with a firm’s weighting 
in the CSI 300 Index, while a firm’s weighting in the CSI 300 Index is exogenous to 
the market reaction to a PEP announcement. Table 7 shows the first and the second 
stage estimations of the IV regressions. 
(Insert Table 7 Here) 
The first stage regression shows that institutional holdings in a firm are well 
instrumented by the firm’s weighting in the CSI 300 Index (significant at the 1% 
level). In addition, the second stage regressions show that the impact of institutional 
ownership on market reaction as well as long-run firm performance are consistent 
with our earlier findings, i.e., higher institutional holdings ex ante are associated with 
                                                        
14 The CSI 300 Index is a capitalization-weighted stock market index designed to replicate the 
performance of 300 representative stocks traded in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. The 
index is compiled by the China Securities Index Company, Ltd. 
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a smaller market reaction and a better long-run firm performance. 
 
5.2 Channel: Institutional shareholdings and PEP discount rate 
We run additional tests to rule out some alternative explanations. As the coefficient of 
institutional holdings is negative, one potential explanation is that institutional 
investors may collude with the largest shareholders and destroy firm value. However, 
the interaction term with participation is significantly positive, which indicates that 
market investors still interpret such PEPs as beneficial to firm valuations. Also, the 
average CAR is significantly positive around the PEP announcements in Figure 3, 
which indicates that the market welcomes the presence of institutional investors. 
Another explanation is that institutional investors are actively monitoring the firm, so 
that the market expects an improvement of corporate governance in the PEP issuers 
with the presence of institutional investors.  
To rule out these two alternative explanations, it is essential to investigate the 
relationship between institutional investors and largest shareholders. We analyze the 
impact of institutional shareholdings ex ante on the PEP discount rate. Brophy et al. 
(2004) show that post-issue performance depends on the nature of PEP terms. Hertzel 
and Smith (1993) find that the discount rate in the PEPs is lower if the controlling 
shareholder participates. We expect that the discount rate will be lower if institutional 
investors can monitor the controlling shareholders.  
(Insert Table 8 Here) 
Table 8 shows that when the controlling shareholder participates in the PEP, 
higher institutional shareholdings will induce a higher PEP discount rate. Thus, it is 
unlikely that institutional investors monitor the controlling shareholders. The results 
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are consistent with Kalcheva and Lins (2007), who show that the expropriation risk is 
positively associated with insider control and discount rates in the context of weak 
external governance. If anything, such relation has been dominated by the controlling 
shareholder as the coefficient of Participation is statistically negative, i.e., the 
discount rate is lower when institutional investors participate in the PEPs. Do 
institutional investors collude with the controlling shareholders? It shows that the 
coefficients are significant for liquidity investors but not for strategic investors, 
despite the fact that the latter are more likely to collude with the largest shareholders. 
In sum, our results suggest that institutional investors are unlikely to play a 
monitoring role according to the patterns of market reactions and operational 
performance of PEPs.  
 
5.3 Propensity score matching 
Another potential endogeneity issue is that both firm performance and institutional 
shareholdings could be driven by some omitted variables. We have used multiple 
approaches to rule out this endogeneity concern. On the one hand, we investigate the 
impact of institutional ownership on firm performance in the context of PEP issuance, 
i.e., how the stock market interprets the presence of institutional investors ex ante, and 
also how the participation of institutional investors affects the firm valuation, which 
may alleviate this endogeneity concern. On the other hand, we have used industry and 
year fixed effects to control for some unobserved factors.  
We will use the propensity score matching method to further check the 
robustness of our results. We conduct a counterfactual test in order to examine 
whether the presence of institutional ownership affects the performance of PEPs 
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through alleviating information asymmetries. Figure 5 shows that institutional 
ownership mostly lies in the [0, 5%] interval, while a substantial drop is observed 
beyond 5%. We define 5% as a threshold beyond which institutional investors become 
insiders of a firm with more proprietary information. We focus on firms with 
institutional ownership close to 5%, as crossing the threshold of 5% may be caused by 
firm behaviors that are exogenous to institutional investors (such as stock dividends or 
share repurchases). We define the treatment group as firms with institutional 
ownership of no less than 5%, and others with institutional ownership of less than 5% 
are classified as the control group. 
(Insert Figure 5 Here) 
We employ the propensity score matching method to identify firms in the 
control group that have a similar likelihood for the presence of institutional investors. 
The nearest neighbor matching technique is employed to identify the matched firms. 
In order to obtain a score for the presence of institutional investors, we match firms’ 
financials, governance characteristics and PEP terms. To alleviate selection issues for 
the control group, we perform the random matching for 200 times and find the two 
closest neighbors. Panel A of Table 9 shows that 133 pairs of firms are matched 
successfully. We do not find any significant difference between the treatment and 
control groups in terms of these key matching variables.  
(Insert Table 9 Here) 
Panel B of Table 9 shows that the results are not qualitatively different from our 
earlier results. The presence of institutional investors ex ante is associated with a 
lower short-term stock return and better long-term operational performance, whereas 
the institutional holdings are not correlated with long-term stock returns. These results 
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substantiate a causal relationship between institutional shareholdings and short-term 
market reactions, and institutional investors can select PEP issuers with better 
operational performance in the long term.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper examines the impact of institutional investors on the performance of firms 
raising funds through PEPs from 2005 to 2013. We find that the market reaction to the 
PEP announcements is smaller for issuers with higher institutional shareholdings ex 
ante. In other words, without the presence of institutional investors, the market 
reaction to PEP announcements would have been higher. Also, the long-run firm 
performance can be explained not only by the information conveyed by the event of 
PEP announcement but also by the institutional ownership ex ante, which is consistent 
with Chemmanur et al. (2009), who indicate that institutional investors have private 
information on picking better performing firms. Furthermore, capital expenditure after 
a PEP announcement could be predicted by the market reaction but not by 
institutional ownership, which suggests that institutional investors do not have any 
impact on corporate investment behaviors. It also implies that the information 
revealed by institutional investors is more about the fundamental quality of the issuing 
firm, rather than the prospect of a particular private equity placement. Conditional on 
the participation of institutional investors in the PEPs, the discount is significantly 
deeper when the largest shareholder also participates in the PEPs. Also, our results 
suggest that the relation between institutional ownership and firm performance is 
mainly driven by liquidity investors rather than strategic investors, and they convey 
proprietary information to the market instead of monitoring the PEP issuers. Put it 
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differently, independent financial institutions have superior knowledge about selecting 
stocks as compared to other corporate investors with potential business ties with the 
PEP issuers. In addition, the so-called “qualified market participants” such as private 
equity and foreign investors are still limited in their presence in China, which needs 
more support during the reform of the Chinese capital market. Furthermore, the 
sensitivity of firm performance to institutional ownership is more pronounced in small 
firms, which exhibit severer information asymmetry.  
Institutional investors respond actively to corporate events. Chemmanur et al. 
(2009) find that for SEOs with better earnings persistency, institutional investors 
achieve higher stock returns by increasing their shareholdings in these firms. With the 
participation of institutional investors, information asymmetries between the issuers 
and the market are mitigated substantially. One policy implication of our results is that 
independent financial institutions should be encouraged more to participate in the 
stock market in China, in particular the QFIIs, which only accounts for less than 1% 
of institutional ownership. The presence of these financial institutions will be helpful 
in screening the issuers of PEPs with better operational performance, thus leading to a 
more efficient capital market in China.  
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Figure 1: Development of mutual funds in China, 2004–2014.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Institutional ownership and private equity placements in China, 2005–2013 
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Figure 3: CAR[-30, +30] of PEP announcements 
 
  
Figure 4: Relative trading volume [-30, +30] of PEP announcements 
 
Note: In Figure 3 and Figure 4, “0” stands for PEP firms without the presence of institutional investors 
(ownership of less than 5%), while “1” represents those with institutional investors whose ownership is 
no less than 5%. CAR is the cumulative abnormal return computed by the market model. Relative 
trading volume is computed by the daily trading volume divided by the average trading volume in the 
recent 360 days prior to the event period, which starts from the 30th day before the PEP announcements 
and ends on the 30th day afterwards. 
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Figure 5: Histogram of institutional shareholdings 
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Table 1: Distribution of private equity placements (PEPs) and institutional ownership.  
This table reports the annual distribution of PEP events of listed firms on Chinese A-share stock market 
from 2005 to 2013. Institutional Ownership represents the average proportion of institutional 
ownership in these PEP issuers. Increase and Decrease describe the number of the listed firms with 
PEPs, whose institutional ownership changes in each period. 
 
Year Number Institutional ownership 
Change of institutional ownership in PEPs 
Increase % Decrease % 
2005 2 4.8% 2 7.3% 0 2.3% 
2006 139 6.6% 78 14.2% 61 3.3% 
2007 114 11.5% 60 22.2% 54 6.1% 
2008 70 15.2% 34 27.0% 36 9,7% 
2009 124 21.6% 67 34.5% 57 14.3% 
2010 124 28.7% 59 37.8% 65 22.3% 
2011 100 33.7% 55 40.1% 45 28.5% 
2012 153 36.0% 58 40.4% 95 32.4% 
2013 146 38.0% 68 44.4% 78 33.6% 
Total 972 21.4% 481 30.0% 491 16.5% 
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Table 2: Summary statistics.  
This table presents descriptive statistics of the key variables. CAR[-X, +Y] is the cumulative abnormal 
return during the announcement periods of PEPs, starting from X days before and ending Y days 
afterwards. The event date is defined as the date on which the PEP plan is first issued. ROA is the 
proportion of net profits over total assets. Both the ROA one year later and the 3-year-average ROA are 
documented. Institutional holding is the proportion of equity shares held by institutional investors. 
Participation equals 1 if institutional ownership increases during the season when the PEP plan is first 
announced. All variable definitions are in Appendix 1. 
 
Dependent Variable Obs. Mean Median Sd. Min. Max. 
CAR[0] 972 0.018 0.001 0.051 -0.141 0.168 
CAR[-1,+1] 972 0.211 0.071 0.072 -0.048 0.575 
CAR[-3,+3] 972 0.171 0.046 0.381 -0.182 0.895 
CAR[-5,+5] 972 0.093 0.050 0.183 -0.524 0.822 
CAR[-7,+7] 972 0.101 0.056 0.209 -0.580 1.018 
CAR[-30,+30] 972 0.104 0.061 0.340 -2.603 1.658 
CAR[-3,+1] 972 0.065 0.046 0.110 -0.258 0.456 
CAR[-5,+1] 972 0.070 0.048 0.119 -0.231 0.529 
CAR[-7,+1] 972 0.073 0.051 0.129 -0.307 0.570 
CAR[-30,+1] 972 0.075 0.048 0.207 -1.274 1.217 
CAR[0,365] 695 0.026 0.005 0.477 -1.385 1.888 
ROA[0,1] 932 0.024 0.021 0.044 -0.148 0.166 
ROA[0,3] 896 0.026 0.025 0.035 -0.148 0.166 
Independent Variables       
Institutional holding 78,444 0.217 0.127 0.238 0 0.816 
Participation 972 0.495 0.000 0.500 0 1 
Control Variables        
Firm size 76,860 21.723 21.551 1.343 18.729 26.533 
Leverage 76,860 0.500 0.491 0.264 0.040 1.921 
ROA 59,517 0.023 0.017 0.042 -0.148 0.166 
Collect 845 0.314 0.170 0.492 0.015 4.307 
Discount 796 0.215 0.214 0.290 -0.919 0.798 
Prior_90AR 972 0.000 0.000 0.004 -0.020 0.009 
Prior_90Risk 845 0.027 0.026 0.008 0.010 0.057 
SOE 78,444 0.600 1.000 0.490 0 1 
Largest 76,824 0.386 0.369 0.166 0.008 1 
Board 76,860 2.194 2.197 0.204 1.609 2.708 
Independence 76,860 0.368 0.333 0.053 0.273 0.571 
Duality 76,860 0.230 0.000 0.421 0 1 
 
 
  
[Type text] 
 
Table 3: The impact of institutional ownership on the market reaction to PEP announcements. 
The dependent variable CAR[-3,+3] is the cumulative abnormal return to the announcement of PEPs, 
starting from 3 days ahead of and ending on the third day after the event. Institutional holding is the 
proportion of equity shares held by institutional investors. Participation equals 1 if institutional 
ownership increases during the season when the PEP plan is first announced. All variable definitions 
are in Appendix 1. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
 CAR[-3,+3]
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Institutional holding -0.251*** -0.347*** -0.231*** -0.225*** -0.228***
 (0.053) (0.067) (0.066) (0.075) (0.076) 
Participation -6.553*** -12.636*** -7.330** -7.970** -7.604**
 (2.256) (3.445) (3.245) (3.453) (3.473) 
Institutional holding x 
Participation  
0.231** 0.156* 0.223** 0.207** 
  (0.099) (0.092) (0.101) (0.102) 
Firm size  -6.210*** -3.577*** -3.791***
  (0.950) (1.132) (1.204) 
Leverage  43.630*** 37.607*** 38.117***
  (3.778) (4.099) (4.126) 
ROA  1.571*** 1.369*** 1.393***
  (0.241) (0.253) (0.258) 
Collect  -1.558 -2.112 
  (2.465) (2.490) 
Discount  -0.050 -0.049 
  (0.040) (0.040) 
Prior 90AR  -37.314*** -37.288***
  (3.390) (3.421) 
Prior 90Risk  12.128*** 12.142***
  (1.623) (1.632) 
SOE  1.686 
  (2.357) 
Largest  9.792 
  (7.601) 
Board  -6.258 
  (6.612) 
Independence  5.535 
  (24.374) 
Duality  -1.396 
  (2.875) 
Constant 29.067** 31.415*** 135.227*** 63.100* 71.866**
 (11.906) (11.917) (22.150) (32.599) (36.185) 
Industry, year and Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observation 896 896 875 713 713 
Adjusted-R square 0.149 0.153 0.295 0.436 0.435 
 
  
[Type text] 
 
Table 4: The impact of institutional ownership on firm performance.  
Firm performance is measured by 1-year and 3-year average ROA, and 1-year cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR[0,365]) after the PEP announcement. ROA is net profits over total assets. 
Institutional holding is the proportion of equity shares held by institutional investors. Participation 
equals 1 if institutional ownership increases during the season when the PEP plan is first 
announced. All variable definitions are in Appendix 1. White heteroscedasticity robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
  Firm performance 
ROA[0,1] ROA[0,3] CAR[0,365] CAPEX[0,1] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CAR[-3, +3] 0.008 0.010** 0.384* -0.001*** 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.209) (0.000) 
Institutional holding 0.017 0.026*** 0.063 0.001 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.141) (0.001) 
Participation 0.251 1.087** -0.883 0.017 
 (0.520) (0.431) (6.998) (0.032) 
Institutional holding x Participation -0.002 -0.014 0.047 -0.000 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.191) (0.001) 
Firm size 0.227 -0.030 -0.966 -0.010 
(0.179) (0.149) (2.409) (0.011) 
Leverage -1.492** -0.224 9.327 0.109*** 
(0.637) (0.528) (9.713) (0.039) 
ROA 0.391*** 0.358*** -0.536 -0.004* 
 (0.037) (0.031) (0.598) (0.002) 
Collect -0.265 -0.300 8.915 0.001 
(0.398) (0.330) (6.972) (0.026) 
Discount 0.616 0.089 24.657*** -0.027 
(0.564) (0.468) (7.802) (0.034) 
Prior_90AR -0.985* -0.684 -8.919 -0.029 
(0.555) (0.461) (7.659) (0.034) 
Prior_90Risk -0.044 -0.394* -2.124 -0.006 
(0.267) (0.222) (3.601) (0.016) 
SOE -0.327 -0.656** 2.967 0.007 
(0.340) (0.283) (4.483) (0.021) 
Largest -0.227 0.450 -19.810 0.007 
(1.106) (0.917) (14.407) (0.067) 
Board -0.214 -0.939 12.117 -0.057 
(0.951) (0.789) (12.608) (0.058) 
Independence -6.496** -4.188 45.535 -0.138 
(3.292) (2.752) (43.259) (0.199) 
Duality 1.021** 0.441 2.742 0.001 
(0.408) (0.338) (5.434) (0.025) 
Constant -1.714 8.522* 26.314 0.297 
(5.080) (4.642) (67.963) (0.308) 
Industry, year and season fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observation 585 584 498 574 
Adjusted R-square 0.332 0.327 0.156 0.100 
 
[Type text] 
 
Table 5: Subsample analysis 
To address heterogeneity among PEP issuers, we classify firms by firm size, leverage, past performance and state ownership. Firm size is the log of total assets. 
Leverage is a ratio of total debts in year t to the total assets at the end of year t-1. Past performance is measured by the ROA in year t-1. We split the sample by 
the median value of the firm size, leverage and past performance, and also by the state ownership. State ownership is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ultimate 
controller of the PEP issuer is government or government agencies, such as State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Diff. of 
coefficient measures the difference in the coefficient of Institutional holding across subsamples, and the p-value of the difference is in the parentheses below. 
 CAR[-3,+3] 
 Firm size  Leverage  Past performance  State Ownership 
 Small Big  Low High  Poor Good  Private SOE 
Institutional holding -0.393*** 0.043  -0.259*** -0.312**  -0.352*** -0.264*  -0.295** -0.300** 
 (0.125) (0.118)  (0.092) (0.131)  (0.111) (0.154)  (0.145) (0.124) 
Participation -19.945*** 11.861*  -15.032*** -7.625  -19.586*** 1.496  -10.465 -10.080* 
 (5.517) (6.429)  (4.436) (6.305)  (5.402) (7.275)  (6.712) (5.874) 
Institutional holding x Participation 0.468*** -0.333**  0.344*** 0.224  0.431*** -0.100  0.252 0.223 
 (0.176) (0.152)  (0.117) (0.178)  (0.160) (0.189)  (0.197) (0.160) 
Constant 224.047*** -19.066  126.605** 10.757  163.947*** 0.502  187.854** 54.318 
 (75.902) (62.174)  (51.866) (53.998)  (52.273) (71.692)  (74.172) (52.467) 
Financial characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Corporate governance Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
PEP characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry, year and season fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observation 365 225  228 362  342 248  282 308 
Adjusted-R-squared 0.509 0.024  0.265 0.471  0.486 0.348  0.443 0.354 
            
Diff. of coefficient 
P-value 
-0.436  0.053  -0.088  0.005 
(0.001)  (0.737)  (0.612)  (0.9752) 
[Type text] 
 
 
Table 6: Differed impact of strategic or liquidity investors on firm performance.  
Following Noe (2002), institutional investors are classified as strategic investors and liquidity investors. Strategic investors include private equity, pension funds, 
social security funds, commercial banks, insurance companies, brokerage firms, listed corporate investors and non-listed corporate investors. Liquidity investors 
include mutual funds, qualified foreign institutional investors (QFIIs), trust funds and financial products. The control variables are the same as in the regression 
models in Tables 4–5, whose coefficients are omitted for brevity. Industry, year and season fixed effects are controlled for. All variable definitions are in Appendix 1. 
The results reported below are qualitatively similar if we include pension funds as grey institutional investors. White heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in are 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
   Strategic investors   Liquidity investors 
1-Year 3-Year CAR CAR  1-Year 3-Year CAR CAR
 ROA ROA [-3,+3] [0,365]  ROA ROA [-3,+3] [0,365]
Institutional holding 0.002 0.010 -0.266*** 0.324**  0.055*** 0.051*** -0.255** -0.184
(0.012) (0.010) (0.091) (0.162)  (0.016) (0.014) (0.129) (0.232)
Participation 0.025 0.431 -8.251*** 3.938  0.502 0.790*** -5.159* 6.605
(0.389) (0.324) (3.013) (5.404)  (0.362) (0.299) (2.845) (4.966)
Institutional holding x -0.017 -0.020* 0.232** -0.354*  -0.010 -0.005 0.386** 0.123
 Participation (0.014) (0.012) (0.110) (0.193)  (0.022) (0.018) (0.176) (0.315)
Constant -2.272 4.022 75.624** 0.954  1.234 7.703** 66.080* 3.882
(4.356) (3.780) (36.105) (71.456)  (4.390) (3.757) (36.933) (72.392)
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry, year and season Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 712 710 713 603  712 710 713 603
Adjusted R-square 0.342 0.309 0.437 0.161  0.357 0.338 0.432 0.160
[Type text] 
 
Table 7: Endogeneity.  
Institutional holding is instrumented by the weight of the stock as a constituent in the CSI 300 
index in the same quarter. PEP firms that have never been a CSI 300 index constituent in our 
sample period are excluded. Both the first stage and the second stage results are presented. Market 
reaction is measured by the cumulative abnormal return in a 7-day window (CAR[-3, +3]). Firm 
performance is measured by 3-year ROA after the PEP announcement. ROA is net profits over 
total assets. Institutional holding is the proportion of equity shares held by institutional investors. 
All variable definitions are in Appendix 1. White heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
CAR[-3,+3] 3-year average ROA 
 First Stage Second Stage First Stage Second Stage 
Weight in CSI 300 index 0.134***  0.148***  
(0.019)  (0.017)  
Instrumented institutional holding  -0.375*  0.046** 
  (0.197)  (0.023) 
Constant 0.540** 0.327 0.479 -1.556 
(0.240) (0.348) (0.349) (6.943) 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry, Year, Season Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observation 166 166 222 222 
R-square 0.478 0.591 0.506 0.250 
 
 
 
 
 
  
[Type text] 
 
Table 8: Institutional shareholdings and PEP discount rate.  
The discount rate is in percentage on the left-hand side. Largest shareholder participation equals 1 
if the largest shareholder (or the controlling shareholder) is one of the subject at which the PEP is 
targeted. Subsample regressions are conducted to test the different impact of institutional investors 
on the PEP discount rate. White heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, 
** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
 Discount rate 
 All  Strategic investors  Liquidity investors 
Largest shareholder Yes No  Yes No  Yes No 
         
Institutional holding 0.244* 0.139  0.205 0.057  0.389* 0.221 
 (0.139) (0.090)  (0.155) (0.104)  (0.219) (0.164) 
Participation -13.395** 3.561  -5.804 -3.313  -9.157* 6.012 
 (6.228) (4.619)  (5.297) (4.145)  (4.757) (3.714) 
Institutional holding x 
Participation 
0.037 -0.160  -2.174 -4.480**  0.176 -0.443* 
 (0.174) (0.127)  (1.883) (1.757)  (0.343) (0.236) 
Constant 102.937* 70.117  107.829* 63.177  109.819* 81.258* 
 (55.632) (43.563)  (57.941) (43.655)  (57.552) (44.589) 
Control Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry, Year, Season Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observation 275 315  275 315  275 315 
Adjusted-R-squared 0.290 0.232  0.251 0.230  0.265 0.236 
 
  
[Type text] 
 
Table 9: Propensity score matching.  
We employ propensity score matching method to measure the propensity of institutional presence 
in a PEP firm. ATT means average treatment effect on the treatment group. The treatment group is 
PEP firms with institutional ownership between 5% and 10%. The control group is PEP firms with 
institutional ownership of less than 5%. Nearest neighboring matching is employed as the 
matching method. In order to have more matched pairs of firms, we look for 2 neighbors for each 
sample firm. 
 
 Panel A: Matching within each industry, year and season 
 Pre-PEP Institutional holdings 
[5%,10%] (N=133) 
Pre-PEP Institutional holdings 
(0, 5%) (N=133) 
T-stat of 
difference 
Firm size 21.140 21.135 0.02 
Leverage 0.580 0.539 0.69 
ROA 1.384 2.616 -1.12 
Collect 0.350 0.267 1.04 
Discount 0.263 0.269 -0.11 
AR_90 0.025 -0.017 0.67 
Risk_90 0.028 0.030 -1.39 
SOE 0.519 0.519 0.00 
Largest 0.367 0.342 0.91 
Board size 2.215 2.192 0.54 
Independence 0.368 0.373 -0.55 
Duality 0.135 0.115 0.29 
 Panel B: Ex post PEP performance 
CAR[-3,+3] 0.088 0.361 -1.97 
CAR[0,365] 0.199 0.038 1.02 
ROA[0,1] 0.037 0.015 2.15 
ROA[0,3] 0.031 0.021 1.68 
[Type text] 
 
Appendix: Definitions of key variables 
Variable Definition 
CAR[-3,+3] 
Sum of abnormal returns during the [-3, 3] window calculated with a market 
model 
ROA Net profits over total assets 
CAPEX[0,1] The ratio of net cash flow on investment in period t+1 to total asset in year t 
Institutional 
holding 
Proportion of equity shares held by institutional investors 
Participation Equals 1 if institutional ownership rises after announcement, and 0 otherwise 
Size Logarithm of total assets 
SOE Equals 1 if it is a state-owned firm, and 0 otherwise 
Leverage Total liabilities over total assets 
Collect Logarithm of the amount of money raised from PEPs, in RMB 
Discount 
Issuing price of PEPs minus the benchmark price scaled by the benchmark 
price (i.e., the stock price for 20 days prior to the announcement date) 
Prior_90AR 
Abnormal return in 90 days prior to the PPE announcement, i.e., the average of 
the actual daily return minus expected daily return following a market model 
for the 90 days before the announcement 
Prior_90Risk Standard error of the abnormal return in 90 days prior to the PPE announcement 
Largest Proportion of equity shareholdings of the largest stockholder 
Board Logarithm of the number of directors on board 
Independence Proportion of independent directors on board 
Duality Equals 1 if the CEO also holds the chairman position, and 0 otherwise 
 
 
 
